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Abstract This paper analyses country-specific determinants of knowledge flows with a view to uncover 
the role of cross-organizational interactions. Using a sample of some 600,000 patents from the EU27 member 
states in the period 1990-2007, we take backward citations as dependent variable and find that technological 
sophistication and research size have a positive effect on knowledge flows. While a national bias towards applied 
research and development has a negative impact, individual public-private cooperation has a moderating effect 
due to the generation of scientific knowledge by public institutions. The present study contributes to the debate 
concerning the direction of R&D investments and provides empirical support to policies aimed at the 
enhancement of public-private cooperation. 
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JEL codes O31 • O33 • O34 
1. Introduction 
A knowledge flow consists in the transmission of information between two parties via specific 
communication channels whose viability is crucial for successful knowledge creation, both within organizations 
and countries (Nonaka 1994). In spite of well-known limitations, patent citations are widely held as reliable 
indicators of knowledge flows (see e.g. Jaffe et al. 1993; Roach and Cohen 2013). Patents are codified sources of 
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scientific and technological information about new knowledge (invention) and knowledge flows (the state-of-
the-art). Examiners and applicant(s) include citations to previous patents and other documents that question or 
vindicate the novelty of the invention, thus conveying a description of part of the knowledge flows related to the 
patent (Narin et al. 1997). Depending on the direction, patent citations can be either backward or forward. The 
former include citations to a document that was published prior to the document citing one while posterior 
documents citing prior literature generate ‘forward citations’. Backward citations are commonly used as an 
indicator of the pool of knowledge underpinning the patented invention or, put otherwise, to capture its degree of 
localization (Almeida and Kogut 1997). Forward citations instead are used to gauge the technological impact of 
an invention (Bacchiocchi and Montobbio 2009).  
While by and large previous research has focused on forward citations (e.g. Fier and Pyka 2014) less attention 
has been paid to backward citations and to their links with the broader institutional environment. Backward 
citations are good predictors of forward citations and, thus, of the value of a patent (Harhoff et al. 2003; Hall et 
al. 2005; Kamiyama et al. 2006; Yang e al. 2010). In our view, understanding the determinants of backward 
citations holds the promise of revealing important features of knowledge flows. The amount of citations 
contained in a patent varies across technologies, years, filing through the United States or the European Patent 
Office, but these characteristics tend to be discussed in a rather descriptive fashion (Tijssen 2001; Callaert et al. 
2006). In this paper we focus on the effect of country-specific characteristics on backward citations as a peculiar 
yet understudied feature of patents, in light of the widely accepted notion that resource endowment and 
technological specialization shape patterns of knowledge generation and diffusion (Antonelli 2008). In so doing 
we also uncover the connection between country-specific characteristics and knowledge flows.  
The focus proposed here has conceptual and practical relevance. Country-specific characteristics are at the 
heart of an ongoing debate concerning the reliability of national comparisons of innovation system performance. 
Policy-oriented studies seeking to establish rules of thumb for enhancing innovation opportunities have spurred 
benchmarking studies that analyse innovation indicators to identify best practices and to derive policy 
recommendations (see e.g. OECD 1998). However, as Balzat and Hanusch (2004) point out, although this stream 
of research enriches the set of empirical indicators and methods, it obscures systemic dissimilarities across 
different national contexts. In relation to the theoretical debate the present paper addresses this shortcoming by 
proposing a connection between different approaches to national competitiveness. More specifically, we explore 
the influence of the background conditions for knowledge flows such as technological sophistication, research 
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size, composition of R&D funding and expenditure, and public-private cooperation along the tracks of previous 
work (Griliches 1992; Branstetter 1998). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the main conceptual issues; Section 
3 presents the data and the methodology, and Section 4 provides a discussion of the results and their 
implications. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the main findings. 
2. Background literature and research hypotheses 
This section reviews three strands of literature and elaborates the three main hypotheses of the paper. 
2.1. Technological sophistication and research size 
For the purposes of this paper we focus on the concept of ‘National Innovative Capacity’ (NIC) proposed by 
Furman et al. (2002: 900). NIC is defined as ‘the ability of a country to produce and commercialize a flow of 
innovative technology over the long term’ as a framework to analyse the interplay among quality of common 
innovation infrastructure, cluster conditions and linkages to measure. This concept draws on endogenous growth 
theory (see e.g. Romer 1990), international competitiveness (Porter 1990) and the traditional national innovation 
systems approach (Freeman 1987). 
Quality of the common innovation infrastructure (not to be confused with quality of innovation) is a term also 
coined by Furman et al. (2002) in reference to several types of inputs for innovative capacity, e.g. technological 
sophistication and research size. Empirical measures expressing economic, scientific or technological strength 
are positively related to NIC (Furman et al. 2002; Furman and Hayes 2004; Hu and Matthews 2005; Hu and 
Matthews 2008; Doyle and Connor 2013). 
This positive association suggests that large technological sophistication and research size mitigate the 
complex coordination challenges that usually arise in the presence of distributed knowledge-creating entities. 
This leads us to put forth the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Technological sophistication and research size positively influence knowledge flows. 
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2.2. The structure of funding and performance of research and development  
In this section, we examine two measures of the R&D structure: share of business R&D funding, and share of 
university R&D expenditure. According to Sapir (2003) a large share of business funding of R&D is a good 
indicator of differences between more or less innovative country blocks (such as US versus EU), or between 
countries within Europe –for example Finland, Sweden and Germany compared to Mediterranean countries. The 
widespread decrease in business R&D funding observed across OECD countries in 1981–2003 (Dinges et al. 
2007) has occasionally become the target for policy. For example, the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 set a target of 
two-thirds of total R&D funding should be business funding compared to the (then) 55% share (target set at 
Barcelona in 2002, EC 2002: 24).
 1
 
Furman et al. (2002) put business R&D funding at the core of their NIC concept, and use the fraction of total 
R&D spending funded by the private sector as the main indicator of the vitality of the national environment for 
innovation. The main result of this study is that business R&D funding has a positive effect on NIC (measured as 
number of patents) in various developed OECD economies (Furman et al. 2002). This holds true also for 
catching-up countries (Furman and Hayes 2004), most prominently latecomer East Asian economies (Hu and 
Matthews 2005) and China (Hu and Matthews 2008). The positive effect holds only for small open economies 
while in others the effect is negative (Doyle and Connor 2013). 
Despite this established view that a large share of business R&D funding at country level has a positive 
impact on knowledge production, we expect the impact on knowledge flows to be negative. This is because 
business firms tend to fund corporate R&D that is expected to be profitable while governments pursue social 
benefits that other actors are unlikely to support (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962; Wallsten 2000). Put otherwise, 
business funding is usually aimed at less risky inventive efforts and shorter-term research with tangible results, 
that is, applied R&D rather than basic research. Applied R&D is more likely to generate incremental rather than 
radical innovations and, as Azagra-Caro et al. (2009) show, knowledge flows are scarce in geographic contexts 
where incremental invention prevails. Moreover, sectors specialized in incremental innovation benefit especially 
from changes in demand and interactions with customers and suppliers, compared to sectors oriented more 
towards radical innovation and, consequently in search of scientific and technological knowledge flows, for 
example, science-based sectors (Schartinger et al. 2002). The preference among business R&D funders for 
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 Interestingly, if we include also non-university public research organizations, the share of business funding of 
R&D in the higher education and government sectors is found to increase in Europe, and is higher than in US 
(De Backer et al. 2008). 
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activities that involve less intensive knowledge flows raises concern when firms outsource these activities to 
universities or public research organizations (Goldfarb 2008). 
However, business R&D funding is only one facet of the institutional structure of national R&D. The share of 
university expenditure on R&D is another important determinant of innovation according to the NIC approach. 
Furman et al. (2002) advocate that university research is more accessible to industry than government laboratory 
research, and that universities are a locus of exchange of ideas and produce skilled graduates for industry. While 
they find a positive effect of share of university R&D in innovation results are less robust in relation to the 
funding structure, in particular the effect is insignificant for follower countries (Furman and Hayes 2004), and 
latecomer East Asian countries (Hu and Matthews 2005) except China (Hu and Matthews 2008). The effect is 
positive, but smaller for Spain (Buesa et al. 2002) and for small open economies, while it is negative for the 
remaining countries (Doyle and Connor 2013). A caveat in the article by Furman et al. may explain the scant 
evidence available. Their argument about the importance of universities suggests a positive effect of the intensity 
of university R&D expenditure on innovation, for example, university R&D over GDP. However, their construct 
– share of university expenditure over total government expenditure on R&D (GERD) – has little to do with the 
intensity of academic R&D because countries with a high share of university R&D expenditure may simply have 
very few firms able to conduct R&D, which is not necessarily to imply that their universities are scientifically 
strong. In fact, it is difficult to predict the effect of the institutional structure of R&D expenditure on patenting. 
By contrast, empirical evidence that a large proportion of R&D performed by universities in a country produces 
a direct positive effect on patenting suggests that the former is an indicator of the industrial orientation of 
universities’ R&D, e.g. because they work for industry and/or because they own many patents, which varies 
across countries (Azagra-Caro 2014; Fisch et al. 2014). 
As in the case of a large share of business funding, we posit that industrial orientation of national R&D 
carried out in universities leads to fewer knowledge flows because of narrower involvement of universities with 
the remit of industry compared to academic activities. On the basis of these premises we propose: 
Hypothesis 2. Patents originating from countries with higher shares of business funding of R&D relative to 
other sources, and higher shares of university expenditure of R&D relative to other performers, will capture 
fewer knowledge flows. 
6 
2.3. The moderating role of public-private cooperation 
Empirical studies show that the interplay between firms and their operating environment is essential for 
knowledge creation. A chief cause of growing reliance on external knowledge is the necessity to coordinate 
different forms of knowledge embedded in increasingly complex production processes (Howells 2000). Cross-
country studies on innovative activities in the manufacturing industries show that information networks are 
crucial for innovative outcomes (see e.g. De Bresson and Amesse 1991). In a nutshell, isolated firms achieving 
innovation through their own resources are ‘rare events’. At the same time, collaboration with public research 
institutions is not always a recipe for success. As Hall (2002) shows, universities tend, perhaps naturally, to be 
involved in radically new applications of previously known technology. The broader point is that public-private 
cooperation occurs more frequently in endeavours where the expertise of research institutions is needed to 
reduce the margins of uncertainty. This echoes the old adage that public R&D is a framework condition for 
innovative performance (Mansfield 1998). From the point of view of academics, engagement in contract 
research coincides with increased publication output without affecting the nature of the publications involved 
(Van Looy et al. 2004)
2
. Building on the above, we put forth the following: 
Hypothesis 3. Public-private cooperation has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the share 
of business R&D funding and knowledge flows, and on the relationship between the share of university R&D 
expenditure and knowledge flows. 
3. Methodology and data 
The remainder of the paper proposes an empirical verification of the hypotheses based on a large sample of 
patents in the period 1990-2007. We focus on applications filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) because it 
is a quality patent system (Saint-George and van Pottelsberghe 2013) and references may reflect knowledge 
flows better than national patent systems. Moreover, the case of EPO is adequate to the goal of this paper 
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 Other forms of cooperation encompass private-private and public-public. We focus on public-private 
cooperation because of its inter-sectoral nature, as opposed to the intra-sectoral style of private-private and of 
public-public cooperation. In a study on knowledge flows measured by patent citations, inter-sectoral 
cooperation appears as the most appealing option because it entails accounting for the diversity of attitudes and 
cultural differences towards openness and intellectual property (Stevens et al. 2013). Actually, in studies about 
patents the most analysed inter-sectorial co-patenting activity is university-firm patents, which makes sense 
because it is associated with higher market value (Belderbos et al. 2013). Conversely, public-public co-
ownership is very marginal and often subsumed within one category of single-authorship (Callaert et al. 2013). 
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because it is an international patent office with the same requirements for every country, so national differences 
cannot be attributed to different patent systems. 
Our measure of knowledge flows is number of backward citations in patent data collected by the Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) in 2009.
3
 Backward citations are citations to previous patents or other 
published documents, mainly scientific articles. Figure 1 synthesizes the sample construction. 
{Figure 1 around here} 
Using EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) we constructed a dataset of nearly 650,000 
patents applied for by applicants located in any of the EU27 Member States in the period 1997-2007. The data 
set, similar to the one prepared by Lecocq et al. (2008), contains individual patent applications and grants and 
excludes utility models. The original dataset containing the number of backward citations of direct EPO patents 
was integrated with additional information on the number of backward citations of EPO-PCT filings using 
OECD patent databases. 
In the final sample of over 700,000 patents the average number of applicants from different countries per 
patent is 1.1.
4
 Patents with missing information (mainly related to technology class) and outliers (patents with at 
least 20 backward citations, according to the Hadi method) are excluded. Finally, we matched country of the 
citing applicant (in a given year) to Eurostat national economic and R&D statistics (with a lag of two years). The 
final sample includes more than 560,000 observations.
5
 
The average number of backward citations per patent is about 5. Figure 2 suggests that there is country 
variation in the number of citations per patent. Most differences in this figure are significant according to t-tests. 
Patents with US co-applicants include more citations (6.01), perhaps due to the cultural differences created by 
the USPTO duty of candour, which requires applicants not to report the state-of-the art so selectively as the EPO 
system. Among EU27 countries, the highest numbers of citations (5.44) are in patents from Belgium while the 
lowest numbers (4.66) are in patents from Sweden. 
{Figure 2 around here} 
We explain the determinants of backward citations using the following model: 
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 An international consortium of researchers from the University of Newcastle, Incentim (KU Leuven Research 
and Development), and the Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) (Leiden University) 
implemented the data collection. 
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 Patents featuring a non-EU27 co-applicant were counted twice. For the econometric analysis, we use as a 
weight variable the share of number of applicants to avoid double counting. 
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 Since we dropped many observations due to missing national data, there may be a bias. We deal with this issue 
at the end of the results section. 
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i=patent, j=applicant, k=country of applicant 
Table 1 presents the list of variables and their description.  
Country variables are lagged two years before application year. Per capita GDP, sHTE and GERD measure 
technological sophistication and research size and allow us to test Hypothesis 1. The variables sBFRD and 
sHERD directly refer to Hypothesis 2. The interaction terms sBFRD x public-private cooperation and sHERD x 
public-private cooperation allow us to test Hypothesis 3, u is the idiosyncratic error and ε is an unobserved 
cluster-effect capturing the influence of the group (country).  The remainder are control variables for patent and 
applicant characteristics.
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{Table 1 around here} 
The number of backward citations is a count outcome and negative binomial is preferred to Poisson on the 
basis of overdispersion tests. Preference for standard or zero inflated negative binomial changes across tables 
according to Vuong statistic (see table foots). Models include standard errors clustered by country. 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for the whole sample. 55% of the patents are EPO direct 
applications, 45% are EPO-PCT applications. The most represented technology is in the class ‘Performing 
Operations; Transporting’. Business firms comprise 88% of patent applicants in collaboration with university or 
government bodies in only 0.4% of cases. The sample includes 1% of non-EU27 co-applicants. The countries 
considered have real per capita GDP over 25,000 euros, a share of 19% of high-tech exports over total exports, a 
GERD of almost 30,000 million Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), 57% of BFRD over GERD and 19% of 
HERD over GERD. 
{Table 2 around here} 
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 To test Hypothesis 1, we tried to include additional national characteristics such as full-time R&D personnel, 
human resources in science and technology, value of high-tech exports, gross domestic product, etc. We were 
particularly interested in full-time R&D personnel to closely replicate other works on national innovative 
capacity (see references in section 2), however, they were excluded because of high multi-collinearity. To test 
Hypothesis 2, we used share of the sum of higher education plus government expenditure rather than higher 
education only, which is sensible because in some countries, both are heavily intertwined and the results are 
similar. However, because we found less theoretical support for this procedure, we prefer to present the results 
for higher education only. Finally, we tried country fixed effects but they were highly collinear. 
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In Table 3, we can see correlations between variables and the Variance Inflation Factor, which indicates no 
multicollinearity. 
{Table 3 around here} 
Table 4 shows that EPO-PCT patents have more citations than direct EPO patents. The positive, significant 
time trend (application year) shows that more recent patents receive more citations. There is variation according 
to the technology class of the patent: belonging to classes A, B, C, F and G increases the number of citations, 
being in E has no effect, and being in D and H decreases the number. For institutional sectors, companies are the 
benchmark. Patents applied for by applicants from other institutional sectors have more citations, as shown by 
the positive and significant coefficients. Our variable for public-private cooperation is also positive and 
significant, so if companies co-apply for patents with universities and/or government bodies, the number of 
citations increases. Having non-EU27 co-applicants does not have a significant effect. 
{Table 4 around here} 
Regarding applicant country characteristics, more citations correspond with higher levels of per capita GDP, 
larger shares of high-tech exports, the proxies for technological sophistication. This partially supports 
Hypothesis 1 and resonates with previous literature. Both GDP per capita and high-tech export capacity signal 
the existence of sound knowledge pathways which is in turn a key precondition for the proliferation of 
innovation activities. This is especially true in a systemic perspective whereby accumulated knowledge is 
essential not just in the exploratory stages, but throughout the entire innovation process, via incremental 
feedback generated through collaboration across specialized actors (sees e.g. Kline and Rosenberg 1986). In turn 
citations reflect, if partially, the overall commitment of actors within these systems to develop and improve 
incrementally technology either by developing internally new knowledge or through acquisition from external 
sources. However in this first specification, research size measured through GERD, is not significant, which 
means that Hypothesis 1 is not confirmed. 
Looking at the marginal effects, the number of backward citations increases by 10 with a 1% increase in per 
capita GDP and by 0.7 with a 1% increase in share of high-tech exports.  
The average patent has fewer citations if the applicant is from a country with higher shares of business 
funding and university expenditure over total R&D, although the latter effect is not significant. This partially 
supports Hypothesis 2. Marginal effects indicate that a 1% increase in share of BFRD causes a 1.0 decline in the 
number of backward citations. 
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The interaction terms between sBFRD, sHERD and the variable ‘public-private cooperation’ are positive and 
significant. This confirms Hypothesis 3 and suggests that individual interactions moderate the negative effect of 
R&D oriented towards applied purposes. 
The negative sign of HERD, even if not significant, may sound counterintuitive. Our interpretation after 
section 2.2 is that high shares of HERD do not indicate strength of universities but industrial and applied 
orientation. To illustrate, 0 shows no correlation between the share of university R&D expenditure in total 
GERD with university R&D intensity, while a correlation exists between share of business funding of university 
R&D (positive sign) and share of university R&D corresponding to basic research (negative sign). Hence, in 
Eurostat countries (mostly European) where universities account for the largest share of basic research, business 
firms fund relatively more R&D, mostly applied in nature. 
{Table 5 around here} 
A field in the database reproduces PATSTAT classification of citations according to citations to patent and 
non-patent literature (PL and NPL). We split the sample to carry out a robustness test given that PL is more 
closely associated with a more applied knowledge base compared to NPL. Since we justified that the negative 
effect of share of business funding and university expenditure on the knowledge base on the basis that they 
indicate an applied orientation of the economy, we expect that Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 will hold 
especially for NPL –NPL in view of the fundamental nature of the knowledge base. 
The results in Table 6, Column 1, show that for PL, Hypothesis 1 holds for research size and not for 
technological sophistication. Hypothesis 2 does not hold. Notice also that the coefficient of public-private 
cooperation is no longer positive but negative and significant (0.11 in Table 4 versus -0.06 in Table 6, Column 
1). This lessens the expectation that Hypothesis 3 will hold, because the sign of public-private cooperation for 
PL goes in the same direction as that of share of business funding. Actually, the interaction terms are not 
significant so we find no support for Hypothesis 3: i.e. public-private cooperation does not moderate the impact 
of the composition of R&D funding and expenditure on PL. 
In Column 2, we see that for NPL, in general, all the hypotheses hold. The only surprising exception with 
regards to Hypothesis 1 for NPL is the negative sign of GERD, but the marginal effect is not significant. On the 
other hand, the evidence supports Hypothesis 2. The support is stronger compared to the aggregate model, since 
both the share of BERD and of HERD are negative and significant. The sign of public-private cooperation is 
positive (as in the pooled regression of Table 4) to indicate a moderating effect on the composition of R&D 
funding and expenditure. Thus, we conclude, Hypothesis 3 is valid for PL. 
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The opposite effect of public-private cooperation on PL and NPL deserves some more attention. Universities 
and government bodies have a higher propensity to include backward citations (Table 4), which is due to larger 
numbers of citations to NPL, since the number of citations to PL is smaller (Table 6). An interpretation of the 
opposite effect of public-private cooperation on PL and NPL may be that cooperation with business firms does 
not alter the nature of the knowledge base of universities and of government bodies. Rather business firms adapt 
to the higher scientific and fewer technological content of their public partners’ knowledge base. Such an impact 
is strong enough at national scale to moderate the negative effect of the applied orientation of R&D on scientific 
knowledge flows, not on technological knowledge flows. 
{Table 6 around here} 
The issue of sample selection because of missing data deserves further research. We conducted a Kruskal-
Wallis rank test between the sample used so far (563,360 observations with data on country characteristics) and 
the lost data (back to Figure 1: 131,610 observations). The test rejects the equality of both populations (χ2=447.9 
with 1 d.f. significant at 1%). In an attempt to correct this, we define the variable “sample” equal to 1 if the 
observation has information about country characteristics, and estimate a Heckman selection model where the 
selection equation is: 
( , , ,  sec ,
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       (2) 
Estimation of equation 2 is available upon request. Table 7 contains the estimation of equation 1 after 
selection into the sample
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. While previous results hold in general, Hypothesis 1 is found to be reinforced: GERD 
is significant for the aggregate (Column 1) and per capita GDP is significant for PL (Column 2). 
{Table 7 around here} 
5. Concluding remarks and further research 
Our empirical analysis of the determinants of knowledge flows suggests that the overall economic, scientific 
and technological resources of a country are positive predictors of knowledge flows. This resonates with the 
literature on the use of backward citations in patents as a measure of knowledge flows (see e.g. Jaffe et al. 1993; 
Narin et al. 1997) as well as with empirical studies calling for a deeper understanding of the role of technological 
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sophistication and research size on knowledge flows (Griliches 1992; Balzat and Hanusch 2004). The policy 
implication stemming from our work is that promoting both knowledge creation in the terms of other studies as 
well as knowledge flows in the terms of the present study is compatible through improvements in the resources 
of a national innovation system. 
At the same time we find that the composition of R&D by institutional sector (funding and expenditure) 
matters for knowledge flows. This calls for policies that set targets for share of business R&D funding and share 
of university R&D expenditure. Indeed we find that a stronger bias towards private enterprise in the composition 
of total R&D has a negative impact on the extent to which inventors and examiners acknowledge the state-of-
the-art. This result casts under a new light on the role of business R&D especially compared to the literature 
about NIC (Furman et al. 2002). We ascribe this difference to the predominance of an incentive system that 
particularly privileges applied inventions and, therefore, relies on a narrower (as opposed to basic scientific) 
knowledge base. Since the effect of the composition of R&D by institutional sector on national patenting found 
in other works (see section 2.2) goes in the opposite direction, our findings suggest the existence of a trade-off 
between knowledge creation and knowledge flows. The intuition is that the applied orientation of research in a 
country will lead to higher levels of patenting but, also, to fewer knowledge flows. Policymakers seeking to 
maximize both will need to take this into account when setting targets for the composition of R&D.  
Conversely, public-private cooperation is observed to mitigate the aforementioned bias. The policy 
implication is that institutional characteristics (public-private cooperation) moderate the bias of the national 
context. This applies more to basic than applied knowledge, that is, individual public-private cooperation 
changes the negative influence of an adverse applied context such that it increases the basicness of the 
knowledge base. 
These results complement the literature on knowledge flows that so far has tended towards the analysis of 
forward citations (Roach and Cohen 2013) or the importance of proximity and border contiguity (Quatraro and 
Usai 2014). Considering the broader economic, scientific and technological environment as the explanatory 
dimension seems a reasonable starting point to unpack the effect of country characteristics on knowledge flows. 
Our study adds to the ongoing debate on the impact of resource endowments and direction of inventive efforts 
across national innovation systems, and confirms that the interplay between firms and their public institutional 
counterparts is an important propeller of knowledge flows. This latter finding resonates with the broader 
tendency to rely on a broader knowledge base as way to coordinate different capacities in the context of 
increasingly complex production systems. 
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No doubt, this preliminary study has several limitations. First, the aggregate level of analysis does not capture 
inter-industry differences in patenting, and the associated spillovers in the form of inputs to future R&D. 
Furthermore, the ambiguous sign of the R&D coefficient in the determination of NPL may be due to some 
endogenous effect of allocation decisions on the part of either public research organizations or business firms as 
a response to opportunities allowed by specific technological advances. At present these questions remain open 
and can only be unpacked by means of micro-level studies that control for the effects of cross-industry and 
temporal changes in the distribution of technological opportunities. In a similar fashion, our focus on inter-
sectoral cooperation, although justified (see footnote 2), could be extended to extra-sectoral cooperation, thus 
including private-private and public-public co-ownership of patents. Finally, the extent to which private R&D is 
affected by particular appropriability conditions or by publicly generated benefits in areas of new technological 
opportunities may depend on the particular circumstances of individual countries. Greater availability of 
international data would allow deeper investigation of these issues in the future. 
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Figures 
Figure 1  
EPO patents in 1990-2007 from Patstat 
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Figure 2  
Mean number of citations per patent in the top applicant countries (n= 563,360) 
 
Countries with at least 1% of total number of patent applications (over 4,500 each). Jointly they apply for 98% of 
all patents (45%. Germany, 53% the rest). Asterisks indicate significance of the mean difference between one 
country and the next one, according to t-tests. E.g. the mean number of citations per patent in US is significantly 
higher than in Belgium, but that number in Denmark is not significantly higher than in United Kingdom: *** 
Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. 
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Tables 
Table 1 List of variables 
Variable Description Function 
   
Patent characteristics   
nbackcit Number of backward citations 
Operationalization of knowledge 
flows (dependent variable) 
appshare 1/Number of applicants (used as weight) Weight variable 
epopct 
Dummy=1 if EPO-PCT patent, 0 if direct 
EPO patent 
Control variables 
appy Application year 
IPC: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H 
Dummy=1 if patent classified in a given 
IPC 
  
Applicant characteristics  
Institutional sector: 
company, individual, non-
profit, university, 
government, hospital 
Dummy=1 if applicant classified in a 
given institutional sector 
Public-private cooperation 
(PPC) 
Dummy=1 if at least one applicant is a 
company and at least one applicant is 
either a university or a government body 
Non-EU27 co-applicants 
Dummy=1 if the applicant’s country does 
not belong to the EU27 
   
Applicant country characteristics  
Per capita GDP 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 
Euro per million inhabitants 
Operationalization of technological 
sophistication and research size (to 
test H1) 
sHTE 
High-technology exports: Share of 
manufactured exports 
GERD 
Total intramural Gross R&D expenditure 
(GERD): Purchasing Power Standards 
(PPS) at 2000 prices 
   
sBFRD Business R&D funding: Share of GERD Operationalization of shares of 
business funding of R&D relative 
to other sources and of university 
expenditure of R&D relative to 
other performers (to test H2) 
sHERD 
Higher education R&D expenditure: 
Share of GERD 
   
Interaction terms   
sBFRD x PPC  Operationalization of moderating 
effect of PPC (to test H3) sHERD x PPC 
Sources: IPTS extraction of Patstat (patent and applicant characteristics), Eurostat (per capita GDP, GERD, 
sBFRD, sHERD), United Nations (sHTE). 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (n= 563,360) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
nbackcit 4.936 2.717 0.000 19.000 
epopct 0.447 0.497 0.000 1.000 
appy 1,999.434 4.326 1990.000 2007.000 
A Human Necessities 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000 
B Performing Operations; Transporting 0.279 0.449 0.000 1.000 
C Chemistry; Metallurgy 0.197 0.398 0.000 1.000 
D Textiles; Paper 0.030 0.171 0.000 1.000 
E Fixed Constructions 0.058 0.234 0.000 1.000 
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating; Weapons; Blasting 0.141 0.348 0.000 1.000 
G Physics 0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 
H Electricity 0.206 0.404 0.000 1.000 
Company 0.877 0.328 0.000 1.000 
Individual 0.083 0.276 0.000 1.000 
Nonprofit 0.016 0.124 0.000 1.000 
University 0.011 0.104 0.000 1.000 
Government 0.013 0.113 0.000 1.000 
Hospital 0.000 0.016 0.000 1.000 
Public-private cooperation 0.004 0.063 0.000 1.000 
Non-EU27 co-applicants 0.007 0.086 0.000 1.000 
Per capita GDP 
†
 0.025 0.003 0.002 0.065 
sHTE 
†
 0.187 0.061 0.012 0.590 
GERD 
†
 0.030 0.019 0.000 0.249 
sBFRD 
†
 0.567 0.085 0.137 0.907 
sHERD 
†
 0.192 0.044 0.002 0.671 
sBFRD x Public-private cooperation 0.000 0.005 -0.396 0.198 
sHERD x Public-private cooperation 0.000 0.003 -0.091 0.416 
Weight variable: share of number of applicants. 
†
 Centered for the estimations. 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix and VIF (n= 563,360) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 VIF 
1 epopct 1.00                        1.11 
2 appy 0.14 1.00                       2.00 
3 A 0.09 -0.02 1.00                      1.45 
4 B -0.07 -0.04 -0.20 1.00                     1.43 
5 C 0.13 -0.07 0.10 -0.09 1.00                    1.28 
6 D -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 1.00                   1.05 
7 E -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 1.00                  1.16 
8 F -0.05 0.00 -0.16 -0.05 -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 1.00                 1.29 
9 G 0.04 0.01 -0.15 -0.17 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 -0.14 1.00                1.31 
10 H 0.01 0.02 -0.23 -0.24 -0.19 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.01 1.00               1.54 
11 Individual 0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 1.00              1.05 
12 Nonprofit 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 1.00             1.01 
13 University 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 1.00            1.04 
14 Government 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1.00           1.04 
15 Hospital 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00          1.00 
16 Public-private cooperation (PPC) 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.00 1.00         1.34 
17 Non-EU27 co-applicants 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.07 1.00        1.98 
18 Per capita GDP 0.15 0.59 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.14 1.00       2.13 
19 sHTE 0.20 0.24 0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.42 1.00      1.68 
20 GERD -0.06 0.21 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.56 0.11 -0.07 1.00     3.18 
21 sBFRD 0.03 0.36 -0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.33 -0.24 0.48 1.00    2.30 
22 sHERD 0.11 0.08 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 0.08 0.15 -0.58 -0.47 1.00   2.21 
23 sBFRD x PPC -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.28 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.06 -0.02 1.00  1.32 
24 sHERD x PPC 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.28 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.07 -0.30 1.00 1.32 
Weight variable: share of number of applicants. Mean VIF: 1.51.
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Table 4 Negative binomial estimation of the determinants of number of backward citations 
 1  
Baseline 
2 
Selected marginal 
effects 
3 
+ Moderation 
terms 
4 
Selected marginal 
effects 
epopct 0.15***  0.15***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
appy 0.23*  0.22*  
 (0.13)  (0.13)  
A Human Necessities 0.14***  0.14***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
B Performing Operations; Transporting 0.02***  0.02***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
C Chemistry; Metallurgy 0.15***  0.15***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
D Textiles; Paper -0.02*  -0.02*  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
E Fixed Constructions 0.00  0.00  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; 
Heating; Weapons; Blasting 
0.06***  0.06***  
(0.01)  (0.01)  
G Physics 0.05***  0.05***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
H Electricity -0.01*  -0.01*  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Individual 0.03*  0.03*  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  
Nonprofit 0.15***  0.15***  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  
University 0.24***  0.24***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Government 0.14***  0.14***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Hospital 0.27***  0.27***  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  
Public-private cooperation 0.11***  0.13***  
 (0.02)  (0.01)  
Non-EU27 co-applicants -0.01  -0.01  
 (0.05)  (0.05)  
Per capita GDP 2.03* 10.00* 2.03* 10.03*   
 (1.14) (5.61) (1.13) (5.58)   
sHTE 0.14* 0.70* 0.14* 0.71*   
 (0.08) (0.41) (0.08) (0.41)   
GERD 0.51 2.52 0.51 2.54    
 (0.36) (1.77) (0.36) (1.77)   
sBFRD -0.20* -0.97* -0.20* -0.98*   
 (0.10) (0.51) (0.10) (0.51)   
sHERD -0.06 -0.30 -0.06 -0.32   
 (0.15) (0.76) (0.15) (0.76)   
Constant -3.08  -3.05 10.03*   
 (2.63)  (2.62) (5.58)   
sBFRD x Public-private cooperation   0.52*** 0.71*   
   (0.15) (0.41)   
sHERD x Public-private cooperation   0.67*** 2.54    
   (0.26) (1.77)   
Ln α -2.75***  -2.75***  
 (0.09)  (0.09)  
Observations 563,360  563,360  
Log likelihood -1,183,346  -1,183,339  
Clusters in country 33  33  
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. Standard errors, clustered by country, below 
coefficients. Company is the benchmark for institutional types. Weight variable: share of number of applicants. 
Vuong statistic shows indifference of standard against zero inflated negative binomial. We have tried time 
dummies instead of time trend, with identical results but higher collinearity. 
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Table 5 Higher education expenditure on R&D in Eurostat countries, 1988-2005 
 Observations Mean Correlation with share of 
gross expenditure on 
R&D 
Share of gross expenditure on R&D 414 0.25 1.00 
Percentage of gross domestic product 453 0.32 0.11 
Share of business funding 389 0.07 0.21* 
Share of basic research 197 0.54 -0.43* 
* Significant at 1%. Source: own elaboration from Eurostat data.  
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Table 6 Zero inflated negative binomial estimation of the determinants of number of backward citations: PL vs. 
NPL 
 1 
Patent literature 
2 
Selected marginal 
effects 
3 
Non-patent 
literature 
4 
Selected marginal 
effects 
epopct 0.03***  0.97***    
 (0.01)  (0.02)    
appy 0.19  0.15     
 (0.13)  (0.21)    
A Human Necessities 0.07***  0.28***    
 (0.01)  (0.03)    
B Performing Operations; 
Transporting 
0.11***  -0.98***   
(0.01)  (0.03)    
C Chemistry; Metallurgy -0.06***  0.88***    
 (0.01)  (0.06)    
D Textiles; Paper 0.06***  -0.82***   
 (0.01)  (0.07)    
E Fixed Constructions 0.07***  -1.60***   
 (0.01)  (0.06)    
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; 
Heating; Weapons; Blasting 
0.13***  -1.29***   
(0.00)  (0.04)    
G Physics -0.04***  0.50***    
 (0.01)  (0.04)    
H Electricity -0.07***  0.39***    
 (0.01)  (0.04)    
Individual 0.06***  -0.19     
 (0.01)  (0.13)    
Nonprofit -0.09***  0.49***    
 (0.01)  (0.03)    
University -0.20***  0.58***    
 (0.01)  (0.06)    
Government -0.14***  0.46***    
 (0.01)  (0.04)    
Hospital -0.25***  0.57***    
 (0.10)  (0.12)    
Public-private cooperation -0.06***  0.30***    
 (0.02)  (0.03)    
Non-EU27 co-applicants -0.09  0.17**    
 (0.06)  (0.07)    
Per capita GDP 1.65 6.92 5.90*    4.00    
 (1.02) (4.30) (3.09)   (2.08)   
sHTE 0.05 0.20 0.41**   0.28*   
 (0.06) (0.27) (0.20)   (0.14)   
GERD 0.71* 2.97* -0.79*   -0.54   
 (0.41) (1.70) (0.48)   (0.33)   
sBFRD -0.12 -0.51 -0.45***  -0.31**  
 (0.11) (0.45) (0.13)   (0.09)   
sHERD 0.02 0.08 -0.51***  -0.35**  
 (0.14) (0.60) (0.18)   (0.12)   
sBFRD x Public-private cooperation -0.01 -0.04 1.78***   1.21**   
(0.25) (1.06) (0.33)   (0.22)   
sHERD x Public-private cooperation -0.38 -1.60 2.26***   1.53**   
(0.51) (2.15) (0.47)   (0.31)   
Constant -2.41  -3.51     
 (2.55)  (4.07)    
Inflation constant -4.98***  0.24***    
 (0.30)  (0.07)    
Ln α -3.20***  -0.25**    
 (0.14)  (0.11)    
Observations 563,360  563,360    
Zeros 17,391  440,620    
Log likelihood -1,127,824  -451,567   
Clusters in country 33  33  
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. Standard errors, clustered by country, below coefficients. Company is the 
benchmark for institutional types. Weight variable: share of number of applicants. Vuong statistic shows preference of zero inflated against 
stardard negative binomial. We have tried time dummies instead of time trend, with identical results but higher collinearity.  
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Table 7 Heckman selection model of the determinants of number of backward citations 
 1 
All citations 
2 
Patent literature 
3 
Non-patent literature 
epopct 0.12*** 0.01 0.15***   
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)   
appy -0.98 -0.01 -0.03    
 (0.93) (0.11) (0.07)   
A Human Necessities 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.11***   
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)   
B Performing Operations; Transporting 0.02*** 0.11*** -0.15***  
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)   
C Chemistry; Metallurgy 0.08*** -0.07** 0.34***   
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)   
D Textiles; Paper -0.00 0.09*** -0.13***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
E Fixed Constructions 0.00 0.07*** -0.12***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; 
Heating; Weapons; Blasting 
0.04*** 0.11*** -0.13***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
G Physics 0.03** -0.06*** 0.16***   
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)   
H Electricity -0.03 -0.07** 0.10***   
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)   
Individual 0.04*** 0.08*** -0.06**   
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)   
Nonprofit 0.08** -0.15*** 0.35***   
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)   
University 0.20*** -0.22*** 0.63***   
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)   
Government 0.05* -0.22*** 0.41***   
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)   
Hospital 0.21** -0.31** 0.70***   
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.11)   
Public-private cooperation 0.10*** -0.09*** 0.28***   
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)   
Non-EU27 co-applicants 0.10 0.07 0.14***   
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.04)   
Per capita GDP 1.90** 1.57* 1.02    
 (0.96) (0.88) (1.37)   
sHTE 0.12** 0.03 0.18**   
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)   
GERD 0.56* 0.59* -0.30    
 (0.32) (0.35) (0.23)   
sBFRD -0.19** -0.10 -0.15***  
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.03)   
sHERD -0.05 0.02 -0.16*   
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.08)   
sBFRD x Public-private cooperation 0.46*** -0.06 0.80**   
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.40)   
sHERD x Public-private cooperation 0.65** -0.29 1.40**   
 (0.29) (0.41) (0.68)   
Constant 21.35 1.92 0.80    
 (18.59) (2.23) (1.31)   
Atanh ρ -1.16*** -1.42*** -0.08    
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)   
Ln σ -0.66*** -0.56*** -0.62***  
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)   
Observations 694,970 694,970 694,970   
Censored 131,610 131,610 131,610   
Uncensored 563,360 563,360 563,360 
Log likelihood -606,705 -642,929 -719,371  
Clusters in country 105 105 105 
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. Standard errors, clustered by country, below coefficients. 
Company is the benchmark for institutional types. Weight variable: share of number of applicants. Likelihood ratio tests 
justify the Heckman selection equation. 
